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Irish
Historical Studies, xxix,
no. 114 (Nov. 1994)
The
'flight of the earls' is considered one of the most intriguing events in Irish
history. Traditionally, historians explaining this event have been divided
into two schools of thought. Some have depicted the earls as offended
innocents, forced into exile by unwarrantable pressure from Lord Deputy
Chichester's administration.1
Others
have accepted the conspiracy theory, agreeing with the Dublin government's
contemporary view that the earls fled because they feared that their
treasonable machinations had been uncovered.2
Since 1971, however, historical interpretation of the affair has been
dominated by an article written by Nicholas Canny.3
Departing
from the previous lines of explanation, Canny focused on the intentions of the
earl of Tyrconnell and Cúchonnacht Maguire to leave Ireland in 1607 as the
key to understanding the flight. Anxious to leave the country because they
were in acute financial difficulties, they were determined to seek profitable
service with Archduke Albert, governor of the Spanish Netherlands. The
'premature' arrival of the ship that was sent to encompass Tyrconnell's
passage discomfited Tyrone, then preparing to go to court, causing him to
'panic' and take flight.
Newly
available evidence from continental archives, however, undermines Canny's
account in a number of major respects. In the first instance, it shows that
Tyrconnell had no need to travel to the continent to benefit from Spanish
largesse. It is now known that in the early stages of 1607 he was granted an
annuity worth 4,000 ducats to support him while he remained in Ireland - more,
in fact, than the 300 ducats per month he received after the flight.4 Secondly, it is also clear that Tyrone was not caught
unawares by the arrival of the ship at Lough Swilly. Not only was the ship
sent to procure his passage to the continent as well, but he had perhaps as
much as a month's forewarning of its arrival.5
In
publishing the material from continental archives in 1986, Micheline Kerney
Walsh argued that 'the so-called "Flight of the Earls" was neither a
panic
_______________________________________________________________________________
1
C. P. Meehan, The fate and fortunes of Hugh 0' Neill, earl of
Tyrone, and Rory 0' Donnell, earl of Tyrconnell, their flight from
Ireland and their death in exile (3rd ed., Dublin, 1886), p. 43; T. M.
Healy, Stolen waters: a page in the conquest of Ulster (London, 1913),
p. 42; Sean O'Faolain, The Great O'Neill (Dublin, 1942), pp 272-3.
2 Killen, Ecc. Hist. Ire., i, 480; Gardiner, Eng., i,
413-16; Cyril Falls, The birth of Ulster
(London, 1936), pp 131-2.
3 N. p, Canny, 'The flight of the earls, 1607' in I.H.S., xvii,
no. 67 (Mar. 1971), pp 380-99.
4 Micheline Kerney Walsh, Destruction
by peace: Hugh O'Neill after Kinsale
(Monaghan,
1986), documents 11, 30, 35, 36, 52, 58.
5 Ibid., documents 43a, 56b. For the length of the warning see
Examination of Thomas
Fitzgerald,
30ct. 1607 (PRO., SP 63/222/150a).
160
Irish
Historical Studies
decision
nor a journey into voluntary exile, but a planned, tactical retreat and an
attempt by O'Neill to secure military aid by presenting his case in person to
King Philip'.6 This thesis has not proved convincing. Aidan Clarke
observed that Kerney Walsh's conclusion needed to be 'reconciled with Spanish
coolness' towards the approaches of the earls. Significantly, however, Clarke
further asserted that 'the new material certainly suggests that there may have
been more to the allegations of conspiracy than the presently received version
of the episode allows'. 7
It
is the view of the present writer that the new evidence shows that before
leaving Ireland the earls had been engaged in conspiratorial machinations on
two levels, international and domestic. In the first instance, they had
concluded a treasonable contract with the Spanish authorities shortly after
the conclusion of the Nine Years War in 1603.8 Negotiations to this
end began as early as 1604 when Tyrconnell met the Spanish ambassador in
London.9
At
first the Spanish were reluctant to give Tyrone and Tyrconnell any gratuity
whatever, in case its discovery precipitated renewed hostilities with England.
Eventually the Spanish authorities were persuaded secretly to grant both men a
substantial retainer of 4,000 ducats, the initial payment being advanced in
the spring of 1607.10 In return, the earls were prepared to renew
revolt in Ireland at the behest of the Spanish if required.11
Evidently this commitment on the part of the earls proved decisive for the
Spanish authorities. On granting these annuities, it was acknowledged that
'should war break out again they [the earls] could be of great use' .12
Other
testimony from the recently published continental material demonstrates that
the earls had been forging conspiratorial links within Ireland in the period
before the flight. It can now be confirmed, by Tyrone's own admission, that he
sanctioned Tyrconnell's 'secret dealings' with members of the Old English
community in the period before the flight, aimed at fomenting a revolt, as
Chichester suspected at the time.13 Tyrone's employment of a
'proxy' in such conspiratorial matters was typical, having utilised this
expedient with considerable dexterity during the early stages of the Nine
Years War.14
In
the light of the new evidence, then, the conspiracy theorists were on the
right lines when they suggested that the earls had been involved in
treasonable machinations and that these played a major part in the causation
of the flight.
_______________________________________________________________________________
6 Kerney Walsh, Destruction, p. 143.
7 Aidan Clarke, 'Bibliographical supplement: introduction' in T. W.
Moody, F. X. Martin and F. J. Byrne (eds), A new history of Ireland, iii:
Early modern Ireland, 1534-1691 (2nd
ed., Oxford, 1989), p. 707.
8 Kerney Walsh, Destruction, documents 11, 30, 35, 36.
9 Ibid., document 11.
10 Ibid.,documents 11, 12, 22, 22a, 22b, 22c, 22d, 30, 33, 35, 36.
11 Ibid., documents 11, 43a, 1O2a.
12 Ibid., document 30. The conde de Punonrostro,
the Protector of the Irish in Spain, made clear the contractual basis of the
agreement with the earls when he recommended the granting of the annuities 'so
that they [the earls] may continue to serve Your Majesty and be under
obligation to do so at all times'.
13 Ibid., documents 43a, 56b, 72a; Chichester to privy council, 22 Jan.
1607 (P; R.O., SP
63/221/12).
14 Hiram Morgan, Tyrone's
rebellion: the outbreak of the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland
(Woodbridge,
Suffolk. 1993), ch. 7.
MCCAVITT
- The flight of the earls, 1607
161
Nevertheless,
key issues remain to be addressed. Why, for example, was there such a
proliferation of rumours in Ireland by the summer of 1607 that rebellion was
imminent, when Anglo-Spanish relations, while at times precarious, were on a
relatively even keel?15 In other words, the Spanish authorities had
no reason for fostering rebellion in Ireland by 1607. Tyrone's claim that a
pan-Catholic league was formulated soon after the end of the war in 1603
appears just as problematic. What grounds had he for expecting the Old English
Catholics to throw in their lot with him? After all, during his recent
rebellion they had generally remained aloof from the Catholic cause which he
had then been championing.
The
present article will not only reappraise the conspiracy theory in the light of
the newly published evidence, but will also analyse hitherto unconsidered
circumstances concerning the flight. This entails an assessment of the
influence of Lord Deputy Chichester's confrontational Protestantisation
policy, the 'Mandates' campaign, on the events which unfolded. The
government's aggressive religious policy greatly antagonised the Old English
recusants during 1605-7, nurtured Tyrone's hopes of organising a
pan-Catholic 'league' against the Protestant English, and played a major role
in precipitating the flight.
The
flight of the earls occurred against a background of increasing indications
that Tyrone and Tyrconnell, in alliance with the Old English, were fomenting a
Catholic revolt in Ireland. The original allegations that a plot was afoot
surfaced in the summer of 1606.16 Then,
in February 1607, George St Lawrence, from the Pale, was also arrested on
treason charges. 17 In the Same month the Irish secretary of state,
Sir Geoffrey Fenton, noted other reports that Henry O'Neill, Tyrone's son, and
Sir Christopher St Lawrence, serving with the Irish regiment in Flanders, were
ready to 'answer' an invasion of Ireland.18
By
the late spring of 1607 Ireland was awash with rumours of intrigue. On 27 May 1607
Chichester wrote to the earl of Salisbury concerning an anonymous letter
which had been found at the door of the Irish council chamber. It too alleged
that treason was being planned by Old English recusants and the Gaelic Irish
of the 'north' and 'west'.19 Just before this the London
authorities had privately informed Chichester that the aforementioned Sir
Christopher St Lawrence, soon to become Lord Howth and cryptically known in
government correspondence at the time as 'A.B.', had confessed in England to
his involvement in just such a
_______________________________________________________________________________
15
Occasionally there was considerable friction, particularly over mercantile
issues. It suited neither power at the time, however, to resort to war
(Gardiner, Eng., i, 349; Maurice Lee, James I and Henry IV:
an essay in English foreign policy, 1603-10 (Urbana, 1970), pp
42-5).
16 Chichester to
Salisbury, 12 Sept. 1606 (P.R.O., SP 63/219/105).
17 Confession of George St
Lawrence, 14 Feb. 1607 (Cal. S.P.lre., 1606--8, pp 108-9).
18 Fenton to Salisbury, 12
Feb. 1607 (PRO., SP 63/221/19).
19 Chichester to Salisbury, 27 May 1607 (ibid.,
SP 63/221/57); - to Sir William Ussher, in Meehan, Fate & fortunes,
pp 65-6. According to the informant, the plotters were motivated by 'the
general dislike of unchristian proceedings against them' and they aimed to
secure ‘tolerance in religion’.
162
conspiracy.
Howth incriminated the earl of Tyrconnell and implied that Tyrone was a party
to the plot, although he could not personally vouch for this.20 The
fact that while abroad Howth was reputed to have had a particularly close
relationship with Henry O'Neill, Tyrone's son, probably added weight to his
testimony.21
Why
was there such a plethora of rumours that rebellion was imminent at this time?
As is suggested above, the Spanish had no reason for instigating revolt at
this juncture. The key point is that circumstances in Ireland had changed
greatly since the end of the Nine Years War in 1603. Government informers
indicated that the treasonable machinations in Ireland originated at the time
of the Gunpowder Plot in November 1605 and that religious grievance was a
primary motivating factor.22 This, significantly, coincided With
the implementation of the 'Mandates' policy in Dublin, a campaign of
persecution which aimed to Protestantise Ireland.23 The interplay
between events in the 'Mandates' campaign, the development of a conspiracy and
the timing of the flight were much more than coincidental.
Other
factors contributed to the generation of the conspiratorial ambience which
pervaded the years 1605-7. On one level, for instance, it is possible that
discontented elements in Old English society, aggrieved by the 'Mandates',
disseminated rumours of an impending pan-Catholic revolt purely as a device to
put pressure on the government to abandon its religious policy. What is more,
among the prominent conspirators, against whom concrete evidence of
involvement can be adduced, a variety of additional personal motivations
clearly fortified their convictions. The baron of Delvin, for example, was
deeply aggrieved as a result of the government's attitude to his proprietorial
dispute with the 0'Ferralls.24
As
for Tyrone, he was resentful of the partiality which the Dublin authorities
displayed in his celebrated proprietorial dispute with O'Cahan. The earl was
under pressure in other spheres as well. Not only was he irked by attempts to
deprive him of rights to the Bann fishery, but the expansive claims of
Protestant bishops to lands in Ulster were also a source of consternation. In
addition, he was confronted with a campaign inspired by the Dublin government
to create independent freeholders on his lands.25 A proposal to
create an Ulster presidency was a further source of concern, while there was
the reality of assize judges becoming increasingly active in Ulster.26
It was a measure of Tyrone's considerable irritation with this state of
affairs that when his dispute with O'Cahan was considered at
_______________________________________________________________________________
20 Chichester to Salisbury, 27 May 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/221/57); Brief
collections drawn
from
A.B. between 29 June and 25 Aug. 1607 (ibid., SP 63/222/128i).
21
A spy reported that 'Sir Henry O'Neale and Sir Christopher St Lawrence were
very familiar and inward friends, and were often times bedfellows' (Report of
D.M., son to R.M. of C., 22 July 1607 (Cal. S.P.lre. 1606-8, pp 227-8).
22
Chichester to privy council, 22 Jan. 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/221/12); Brief
collections
drawn
from A.B. between 29 June and 25 Aug. 1607 (ibid., SP 63/222/128i).
23 John McCavitt, 'Lord Deputy Chichester and the English government's
"Mandates
policy"
in Ireland, 1605-7' in Recusant History, xx, no. 3 (May 1991), pp
320-35.
24 The baron of Delvin's confession, 6 Nov. 1607 (P.R.O., SP
63/222/174).
25 H. S. Pawlisch, Sir John Davies
and the conquest of Ireland: a study in legal
imperialism
(Cambridge, 1985), chs 4-5.
26
N. P. Canny, 'The government reorganisation of Ulster, 1603-7' (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University College, Galway, 1967), p. 148; John McCavitt,
"'Good planets in their several spheares": the establishment of the
assize circuits in early seventeenth-century Ireland' in Ir. Jurist. n.s.,
xxiv (1989), pp 248-78.
MCCAVITT
– The flight of the earls, 1607
163
the
Irish council table in 1607, he intemperately tore up O'Cahan's petition in
front of the lord deputy.27
In
stressing the religious motivation for the plot, therefore, it is possible
that Tyrone was concealing manifold personal reasons for his participation.
Naturally, he could not have afforded to emphasise these if he was to
entertain any prospect of securing support among the Old English. Yet his
position was not so inauspicious regarding any of these matters at the time
the plot was hatched, at the end of 1605, for this to account for his
involvement.28 Moreover, experience was to prove that shortly
before the flight he was not only successfully frustrating the government's
freeholder plans in his patrimony, but the proposal to establish an Ulster
presidency was peremptorily rejected by the king as a direct result of his
protestations.29 In fact, as this article will show, evidence of
the king's favourable disposition towards Tyrone exists as late as June 1607.
Having acknowledged that other factors contributed to the discontent of the
various conspirators, however, it is the view of the present writer that the
plot materialised mainly in response to the government's campaign of
persecution.
Chichester's 'Mandates' campaign, directed initially against the Old English, was certainly coercive. Heavy fines and terms of imprisonment were meted out to many leading Old English recusants, while there were allegations of heavyhandedness by troops engaged in enforcing the policy. Not surprisingly, Chichester's 'Mandates' policy proved a great source of antagonism for Old English recusants. After the campaign was first implemented in November 1605, Sir Patrick Barnewall, a leading Old English recusant spokesman, signalled his fear that it could well precipitate revolt. As it happened, the 'Mandates' campaign proved to be a running sore between the Old English recusants and the Dublin government, festering right up until the summer of 1607. Relations were particularly poisoned during the initial proceedings in Dublin, at the time of Chichester's sojourn in Drogheda in the early part of 1607, while Sir Henry Brouncker's activities in Munster throughout much of this time also gave rise to considerable resentment.30
Against
the background of the initial proceedings in the 'Mandates' campaign in late
1605, an uncorroborated report circulating in England at the time assumes a
particular significance in relation to the flight and its origins. It alleged
that the
_______________________________________________________________________________
27 Pawlisch, Davies, p. 73.
28 There is some conflict in the sources about the timing of the
original plot. Howth
confessed
it occurred at Christmas 1605 and that Delvin was involved at that stage,
whereas Delvin confessed his involvement began in late 1606. Howth's
time-scale seems the more reliable, as Chichester had already learned from
other sources, before either of these confessions were made, that the plot
originated in late 1605. See Brief collections drawn from A.B. between 29 June
and 25 Aug. 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/222/128i); Delvin's confession, 6 Nov. 1607
(ibid., SP 63/222/174); Chichester to privy council, 22 Jan. 1607 (ibid., SP
63/221/12).
29
Pawlisch, Davies, p. 68; Tyrone to king, 17 June 1606 (Ca/. S.P.
Ire., 1603-6, p. 549); privy council to Chichester, 2 Sept. 1606 (ibid, pp
548-9).
30
See note 23. General references in this article to the 'Old English' are used
circumspectly, as they were only evolving as a cohesive group in the early
seventeenth century. The 'Mandates' era, however, played a key role in this
process. See Aidan Clarke, 'Colonial identity in early seventeenth-century
Ireland' in T. W. Moody (ed.), Nationality and the pursuit of national
independence: Historical Studies XI (Belfast. 1978), p. 60.
164
lrish
Historical Studies
earl
of Tyrone, who had been in Dublin when the first group of leading recusants
was sentenced in Castle Chamber, remonstrated with the lord deputy about his
religious policy. The earl, it is claimed, would have been arrested but for
the fact that he had been forewarned and departed from Dublin without the
deputy's leave.31 Whether this incident happened or not, the degree
to which the 'Mandates' policy offended Tyrone's newly acquired religious
susceptibilities, as the self-proclaimed champion of Catholicism in Ireland,
should not be underestimated.
The
publication of an anti-Catholic proclamation in Dungannon before the flight
took place provoked in the earl 'great resentment and anger', as he considered
it part of a 'general persecution throughout the kingdom' .32 While
it may be averred that Tyrone initially championed the Catholic cause in the
1590s for pragmatic reasons, the work of Hiram Morgan has shown that he
subsequently demonstrated increasingly genuine commitment to
Counter-Reformation Catholicism.33
The
newly available continental evidence adds substance to the argument that the
advent of the' Mandates' campaign was a critical juncture in events leading up
to the flight of the earls. Thereafter Tyrone claimed that it was this
aggressive Protestantisation policy which inspired his drive to organise a
pan-Catholic 'league' in Ireland. This 'persecution', he maintained, proved to
be the breaking-point for the Old English recusants, who, for fear of losing
their lands, had not assisted him during his rebellion. At that time a change
of sovereign was imminent, and they were confident that lames I would grant
toleration. Disenchanted that this had not materialised, and that in fact a
campaign of persecution had been unleashed against them instead, they proved
amenable to his overtures about organising a 'league'. Tyrone alleged that the
conspirators hoped to throw off the yoke of Protestant English control with
the assistance of the Spanish. By the time of the flight, however, according
to the earl, revolt was not imminent (despite what government informers were
indicating at the time). The conspirators were awaiting a favourable response,
and material assistance, from Spain before making a move.34
Tyrone
was obviously convinced that the Spanish would not tolerate Irish Catholics
being persecuted. What the earl was not to know then about the likely Spanish
response to such appeals, had he remained in Ireland, he was to learn from all
too painful experience during his years in exile. Regardless of any
persecution of Irish Catholics, or the precariousness of his own position, the
Spanish would not break the peace with England unless it coincided with their
own interests.35
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
31
Thomas Phillips to Hugh Owen, Dec. 1605 (P.R.O., SP 14/17/62). That Tyrone was
in Dublin at this key period can be verified (see Tyrone to Salisbury, 6 Dec.
1605 (ibid., SP 63/217/88).
32 Kerney Walsh, Destruction, document 43a; see also Margaret
MacCurtain, 'The flight
of
the earls' in Liam de Paor (ed.), Milestones in Irish history (Dublin,
1986), p. 57.
33 Hiram Morgan, 'The end of Gaelic Ulster: a thematic interpretation
of events between
1534
and 1610' in I.H.S., xxvi, no. 101 (May 1988), p. 28.
34
Kerney Walsh, Destruction, documents 43a, 72a, 1O2a. Tyrone's analysis
of Old English attitudes to the religious issue at the time of the Nine Years
War accords with the conclusions of modem historians. See J. J. Silke, Ireland
and Europe, 1559-1607 (Dundalk, 1966), p. 21; Hiram Morgan, 'Hugh O'Neill
and the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland' in Hist. Jn., xxxvi, no. I
(1993),
p.
28.
35
Kerney Walsh, Destruction, documents 52, 55, 75, 82, 85, 185. The
Spanish exploited Tyrone's presence in Rome. It was considered that 'to the
English, he is a bridle. Their fear of him gnaws at their entrails.'
MCCAVITT-
The flight of the earls, 1607
165
Tyrone's
claims that the Old English plotted with him to establish a 'league' in
Ireland during the years 1605-7 make extraordinary reading, To what extent was
this a sober assessment of the situation in Ireland before the flight, or an
hallucinogenic recollection of events induced by an over-indulgence in Italian
wine and sunshine? Certainly the latter suggestion would be in keeping with
O'Faolain's depiction of the earl in exile.36 It appears that
Tyrone's remarks had at least some basis in reality. Kerney Walsh has argued,
for example, that the idea of offering the crown of Ireland to Spain had
become 'acceptable' to many of the Old English as a result of 'King James I of
England's intolerance of the Catholic religion' .37 However,
corroborative evidence for the involvement of the Old English in the
conspiracy outlined by Tyrone is limited. This may well be due to the fact
that widespread support simply:' did not exist. Alternatively, it may not be
all that surprising given that those involved were unlikely to commit their
treasonable intentions to paper. Nevertheless, in the light of such evidence
as exists, it would clearly be unwise to rule out Tyrone's claims that support
existed among elements of the Old English for a 'league' during the years
1605-7.
In
the first instance, Barnewall's minatory remarks following the launch of the
'Mandates' campaign in late November 1605 cannot be dismissed as empty
rhetoric. Coming so soon after the recusant revolt of 1603, his threat that
the Old English might join a rebellion as a result of the 'Mandates' was by no
means an implausible prospect. It is worth emphasising that in 1603 recusants
in Munster and Leinster were prepared to take an armed stand in support of
toleration.38 Now in 1605 they were faced with the prospect of
persecution, and the motivation to resort to arms must have been considerable.
Certainly Chichester anticipated that there would be a violent response to his
'Mandates' campaign. He set in train contingency military precautions to deal
with it.39
There
is also more tangible evidence that some Old English were prepared to plot
with the Gaelic Irish lords of Ulster in the period 1605-7. Mooney has shown,
for instance, that among those who took flight with the earls were 'members of
the Anglo-Irish families of Bath, Preston, Plunkett, Moore and Weston from
north Leinster'.40 Besides, George St Lawrence was convicted of
attempting to overthrow the Dublin government in the spring of 1607. Among his
alleged coconspirators were a MacMahon and an O'Reilly.41 Then
Lord Howth (Sir Christopher St. Lawrence) made his dramatic confession in the
summer of the same year.42 Finally, having been compromised by
Howth, the baron of Delvin
_______________________________________________________________________________
36 O'Faolain, The Great O'Neill, pp 266-81.
37 Kerney Walsh, Destruction, p. 4.
38 A. J. Sheehan, 'The recusancy revolt of 1603: a reinterpretation' in
Archiv. Hib., xxxviii
(1983),
pp 3-13.
39 McCavitt, 'Mandates', p. 323.
40 Canice Mooney, 'A noble shipload' in Ir. Sword, ii (1954-6),
p. 196. John Bath and Richard Weston signed the Pale petition protesting
against the 'Mandates' (A petition to the lord deputy, Dec. 1605 (Cal.
S.P.Ire., 1603---6, pp 362-5).
41
Confession of George St Lawrence, 14 Feb. 1607 (Cal. S.P.Ire., 1606-8, pp
108-9): Chichester to Salisbury, 27 May 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/221/57).
42 Brief collections drawn from A.B between 29 June and 25
Aug. 1607 (P.R.O., SF 63/222/128i). That Howth was a Protestant does little to
undermine the essentially Catholic nature of the conspiracy. He was, in any
case, very much a maverick figure, and his unstable nature was reflected in
his attitude to religion. Before his departure to serve with Archduke
166
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Historical Studies
confessed
his complicity in treasonable machinations as an accomplice of the earl of
Tyrconnell later in 1607.43
Tyrone's
claims, therefore, that the Old English were seriously contemplating entering
an alliance with him before his flight had at least some basis in reality.
Just as importantly, the corollary of his candid acknowledgement that he had
been engaged in treasonable machinations is that the English authorities were
justified in investigating his activities before the flight. Chichester, as a
result, was not chasing conspiratorial spectres conjured up by his own macabre
imagination.44 The lord deputy, however, did not have the benefit
of Tyrone's post-flight admissions. Against this background, the explanation
for the flight is to be found in an analysis of the efforts made by the
English authorities to fathom the extent to which Tyrone and Tyrconnell were
engaged in treasonable activities. Events were to prove that it was not that
sufficient evidence had been amassed to proceed against the earls on a charge
of treason which caused them to become uneasy and take flight. Rather, it was
the apprehension that such a case had been compiled that proved decisive.
II
Until
the late spring of 1607 the English privy council treated allegations that the
earls had been involved in treason with a large measure of scepticism.45
Lord Deputy Chichester was less dismissive, although he had yet to be
convinced of the exact details of the treason.46 Disturbed by his
discoveries, he determined to remain alert to the possible dangers. It was not
long before his worst fears about a Catholic revolt seemed about to be
realised.
In
the meantime, at an Irish council meeting held at the end of June 1607,
important decisions were taken regarding the controversial Tyrone-O'Cahan
proprietorial dispute. It was on this occasion that Tyrone and O'Cahan sought
permission to present their respective cases in person to the king. The earl
was particularly enthusiastic about the idea. As it turned out, the litigants'
requests were rejected, rather disingenuously, by the Dublin government in
order 'to spare his
_______________________________________________________________________________
Albert
he was reported to have attended mass (see Chichester to Salisbury, 26 Jan.
1607 (ibid., SP 63/221/11). His father signed a letter sent by noblemen of the
Pale protesting about the 'Mandates' (Noblemen of the Pale to Salisbury, 8
Dec. 1605 (Cal. S.P.lre., 1603-6 pp 365-6).
43
Delvin's confession, 6 Nov. 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/222/174). Delvin signed the
Pale petition protesting about the 'Mandates' (Petition to the Lord Deputy,
Dec. 1605 (Cal. S.P. Ire., 1603-6, pp 362-5).
44 Among those who alleged that there was no substance to the
allegations against the
earls
was Sean O'Faolain. He claimed that 'felon-settlers, agents provocateurs,
spies, petty
officials
of every kind dogged them like shadows. Failing to get any evidence to support
the
story
of a plot, Chichester egged on his men to badger his victims into some
indiscretion
that
would justify him in proclaiming them traitors' (O'Faolain, The Great
0’Neill, pp 272-3:
45 Privy council to Chichester, 19 Nov. 1606 (P.R.O., 31/8/199, ff
168-71). This missive
clearly implied that the English privy council believed that Chichester
was over-reacting to the allegations that the northern earls were involved in
a new treasonable conspiracy.
46 Chichester to privy council, 22 Jan. 1607
(ibid., SP 63/221/12); Chichester to Salisbury,
27
May 1607 (ibid., SP 63/221/57).
167
Majesty's
trouble by their importunities, and to prevent the misorders that might
happily break out in their countries in their absence' .47
The
fact was that by the end of June 1607 Chichester's administration had every
reason to be apprehensive about Tyrone's proposed trip to England. At this
time it appeared that the king and privy council in England were far from
convinced that he was deeply involved in treason and remained willing to treat
his petitions with favour. Since the conclusion of the Nine Years War, indeed,
the king had pursued a policy of appeasement towards the ear1.48 It
has already been shown that a proposal to establish an Ulster presidency was
scotched following his protestations. Overall, the king's policy towards the
earl was encapsulated in remarks made in August 1606, when it was stated that
while
he
would not maintain Tyrone in any encroaching upon his subjects as were not
fit, so he would wish all occasion to be taken from him of just complaint,
considering what a dependency the Irish have on him and how ticklish their
disposition is towards the state, and he an instrument apt to make innovation.
It was a
further manifestation of the king's sensitive approach towards the earl that
issues affecting him at this time were to be decided in London and that he was
not to be subject to the 'decision of the law merely'.49 Evidence
dating from as late as June 1607 suggests that James intended to persist with
his assuagement strategy. Even at that stage Tyrone was to be 'assured that
all his Majesty's goodness has been already begun unto him, so he may not
doubt that the same shall be continued'.50 Consequently, Chichester
and the Irish authorities probably feared that James would decide in the
earl's favour in his dispute with O'Cahan and that he would emerge once again
from a visit to the court of King James as the 'real victor'.51
Against
this background, the manner in which King James suddenly adopted an
uncharacteristically hostile attitude towards Tyrone in the middle of July
1607 is all the more remarkable. Writing to Chichester at that time, the king
communicated his decision, quite unexpectedly to all concerned, and despite
the misgivings of the lord deputy and council, to summon Tyrone and O'Cahan to
England for the beginning of the Michaelmas term. It did not bode well for
Tyrone's case, however, when the king also determined that Sir John Davies,
who had played such a prominent role in supporting O'Cahan's case against the
earl, should also come to England 'to guide our judgement'. Overall, the tenor
of this royal missive was decidedly unsympathetic, even menacing, towards the
earl of Tyrone. The king remarked, for instance, that
if
Tyrone means to encroach upon other subjects of little less condition than
himself, and to draw them to such a dependency upon him as is inconsistent
with the security of the state, I cannot forget what the authority is which
God has committed unto me.52
_________________________________________________________________________________
47 Lord deputy and council to privy council, 26 June 1607 (ibid., SP
63/221/88).
48 Apprehensive about the possibility of renewed conflict in Ireland,
this policy was
probably
inspired in large measure by the king's absolute aversion to war. A
contemporary remarked of the king that he was 'the most cowardly man that ever
I knew'. See Conrad
Russell, The crisis of parliaments: English history, 1509-1660
(Oxford, 1971), p. 258.
49 Lake to Salisbury, 27 Aug. 1606 (H.M.C., Salisbury, xviii, pp
254-6).
50 Sir Thomas Windebank to Salisbury, 10 June 1607 (ibid., xix, pp
15O-51).
51 N. P. Canny, 'The treaty of Mellifont and the reorganisation of
Ulster, 1603' in Ir. Sword, ix (1969), p. 261.
52 King to Chichester, 16 July 1607 (P.R.O.. 31/8/201, ff
242-7).
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The
reason given as to why Tyrone was summoned to court is also significant:
We
conceive that we shall sooner and with more authority confirm the earl to our
determination in these differences, if the same shall be not according to his
desire, as it is likely in some respects to fall out.53
Tyrone,
therefore, faced the possibility of defeat on the O'Cahan and other related
issues. More importantly, the general attitude of the king towards O'Neill had
changed markedly in little over a month, the tone of conciliation having been
abruptly abandoned.
How,
then, does one account for the king's volte-face? A perusal of correspondence
between London and Dublin later in July 1607 provides the explanation. It is
clear from this testimony that, as far as the London authorities were
concerned, a fusion was rapidly taking place between their treatment of the
investigations into Tyrone's allegedly treasonable conduct and their attitude
to the protracted controversies, mainly proprietorial, involving the earl.
Hitherto they had considered them separately, according Tyrone the benefit of
the doubt as far as questions about his loyalty were concerned and responding
favourably to the various petitions which the earl presented from time to
time. Two factors dovetailed in June 1607 to dictate a change of tack - the
belated realisation in London government circles of the impact of the
'Mandates' campaign, and the disturbing nature of Lord Howth's testimony.
Having
advised the Dublin authorities to moderate their activities following the
uproar at the time the 'Mandates' policy was launched, it was only by the
summer of 1607 that the king and his advisers in England became aware that the
policy was still causing immense discontent in Old English Catholic areas of
Ireland. As a result, they feared that the recusants were seriously
contemplating revolt.54 It was against this background that Howth,
who had just returned from service with the Irish regiment in Flanders,
confessed that a major plot was afoot in Ireland, with Gaelic Irish and Old
English backing, to overthrow the government. A prime motivating factor of the
conspiracy was asserted to be religious discontent - undoubtedly a reference
to the 'Mandates' policy.55
The
king and his officials in England now had reason for fearing that a
confederation of Irish Catholics was planning a revolt, and a well-placed
informer had emerged to lend support to this suspicion. While it was these
factors which induced the king and his London advisers to adopt a much tougher
approach towards the earl of Tyrone, it was felt that a prosecution for
treason could not be instituted against him. The reasons for this were
twofold. In the first instance, Howth's unstable character gave rise to
considerable doubts. He was variously described in government correspondence
at the time as behaving in his
_______________________________________________________________________________
53 Ibid.
54 McCavitt, 'Mandates', p. 328.
55 Brief collections drawn from A.B. between 29 June
and 25 Aug. 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/222/128i); Delvin's confession, 6 Nov. 1607
(ibid., SP 63/222/174). Howth later re-emphasised the role played by religious
grievance in the formulation of the plot when he commented that 'Tyrone was
never so sure of foreign forces as then he was, and the assistance of the
country, for that the punishment for religion had drawn the hearts of all the
people from the King' (Lord Howth's charge against Sir Garret Moore, May 1608
(H.M.C. Hastings, iv, p.156).
MCCAVITT
- The flight
of the earls, 1607
169
'accustomed
half-wild' fashion and as being 'neither wise nor honest' .56 Besides, having
made such serious allegations, he steadfastly refused to indict his fellow
conspirators in open court, vowing that 'he would rather die'.57
Chichester
also regarded Howth's evidence with some scepticism, a view shared by the
English privy councillors, who remarked that 'as you do note
uncertainty in his word and gestures, so it was here observed'. In their
opinion, it was more likely that Howth had been the instigator of the
conspiracy in question in the first place. The London councillors too were
unconvinced about the veracity of some of the information which he had
provided. Recalling how long it had taken the Spanish to send forces to assist
Tyrone during his rebellion, they were extremely doubtful about Howth's report
that ships were being built at Dunkirk for the transport of the Irish regiment
and' seconding' forces for an invasion of Ireland.58 Howth's
capriciousness was plain. What is more, his version of the conspiracy was
evidently inflated.59 Yet could the authorities afford to dismiss
his testimony entirely given the circumstances in Ireland?
Ostensibly
the English privy council's reservations, especially about the international
aspect of the plot, made it doubt whether Howth's story had much substance.
None the less, the London authorities conceded that the situation in Ireland
was volatile and admitted that there was evidence of disaffection among wide
sections of the populace. The Old English recusant townsmen were included in
this evaluation. They were considered to be disillusioned with English
government on religious grounds - again an obvious reference to the impact of
the 'Mandates'. In spite of Howth's allegations and this acknowledgement of
widespread discontent in Irish society, it was not considered 'worthy to draw
on the king any sudden action'.60
All
the same, the London government decided to take precautions. These illustrate
that despite its superficial dismissal of Howth's testimony, a deep feeling of
unease persisted. Chichester was instructed to assuage 'the strong discontent
of the towns and others now boiling in their hearts by reason of the
President's [Sir Henry Brouncker, lord president of Munster] over-sudden
courses' in religious matters. This was recommended in order that 'the less
would be their [the townsmen's] jealousy if there were any just occasion to
lay hold of any persons of mark'.61 It was this directive which led
to the termination of the 'Mandates' policy.62
While
the currency of rumours about a planned pan-Catholic rebellion benefited the
Old English recusants, in so far as the 'Mandates' policy was aborted as a
result, their prevalence accentuated the London administration's concern about
Tyrone's loyalty. Rumours about his suspected involvement in a conspiracy with
Old English Catholics had suddenly been given increased credibility. The
prospect of a pan-Catholic alliance no longer seemed a mere empty threat.
_______________________________________________________________________________
56 St John to Salisbury, 11 Dec. 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/222/192);
Salisbury to Lake,
c.
Nov. 1607 (H.M.C., Salisbury, xix, pp 315-17).
57 Chichester to Salisbury, 9 0ct. 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/222/153).
58 Privy council to Chichester, 28 July 1607 (ibid., 31/8/199,
ff 236-9). This letter is
dated 22 July 1607 in Cal. S.P. Ire.,
1606-8, pp 231-3.
59 Kerney Wa1sh, Destruction, p. 48.
60 See note 58.
61 Ibid.
62 McCavitt, ‘Mandates’, p.328.
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Historical Studies
The
link between developments in the 'Mandates' controversy and the government
investigations into alleged treasonable activities in Ireland can be further
reinforced. The same letter from the privy council which ordered Chichester to
abandon his 'Mandates' campaign also contained important instructions
regarding Howth and, implicitly, the earl of Tyrone. The deputy was to
encourage Howth to travel to England at Michaelmas 1607 to give an account of
his activities over the previous twelve months:
and
if this could be, or that Tyrone and O'Cahan likewise come over, as we have
desired, it might be of even greater advantage, whatsoever his [Howth's]
advertisement may prove. For which purpose, if any other principal gentleman
whom your lordship suspects should be desirous to come over, you would do well
to further such intentions.63
This
synchronisation of Howth's visit to court with Tyrone's is important. It
provides supportive evidence for the argument advanced by various historians
that a conspiracy was afoot either to imprison the earl or to have him
executed on his arrival in London.64 Yet it by no means proves that
such a course of action was being planned. After all, the London
administration was manifestly dubious about aspects of Howth's information,
while he had insisted that he would not under any circumstances testify in
public.
By
the end of July 1607, therefore, Tyrone was still being accorded the benefit
of the doubt in London, despite being viewed with ever-growing suspicion. It
would seem that at this juncture the authorities there were content to resolve
once and for all the legal wrangles involving the earl, unless concrete
evidence emerged which would have enabled them to indict him for treason.
Writing to Chichester on 31 July 1607, the privy council referred to the
petitions made by Shane MacBrien and others concerning land disputes with the
earl of Tyrone. The deputy was instructed to inform them that they should
travel to England at the same time as Tyrone and O'Cahan in order that their
differences might also be resolved. The avowed objective of this measure was
'to the end the differences of that kind may be ended altogether. . . that his
Majesty nor we be troubled therewith all' .65
If
it is true that by the end of July 1607 the English authorities both in London
and Dublin did not believe that sufficient evidence had been unearthed to
warrant action being taken against the earls, it is equally apparent that the
search for such testimony, far from being abandoned, was intensified. This was
manifested by Chichester's unheralded trip northwards in August 1607.66
While at Slane, the deputy reflected following the flight, he not only dealt
with 'ordinary business', but carefully analysed all the evidence then
available which corroborated Howth's story and concluded that his
investigations were ready for' a present and effectual resolution'. The deputy
believed that the only way to determine for sure whether
_______________________________________________________________________________
63 See note 58.
64 This argument was most recently advanced in Kerney Walsh, Destruction,
p. 50.
65 Privy council to Chichester, 31 July 1607 (PRO., 31/8/199, f. 240).
66 Fenton to Salisbury, 13 Aug. 1607 (ibid., SP
63/222/118). The significance of Chichester's decision to travel north at
short notice is put into perspective by his outright rejection in June 1607 of
a proposal that he should visit Munster, despite earnest solicitations from
various quarters, on the grounds that the earl of Salisbury knew why 'I cannot
well stir from hence [Dublin]’ (Chichester to Salisbury, 8 June 1607 (ibid.,
SP63/221/77)).
MCCAVITT
– The flight of the earls,1607
171
or
not Tyrone was guilty of treason was to obtain a confession from a confidant,
such as Henry
0'Hagan
or the earl of Tyrconnell. He claimed that he was on the point of having
Tyrconnell arrested when news arrived that the earls had fled.67
August
1607 also proved a decisive month for the earl of Tyrone.1t was during this
time that he heard, via a rather circuitous route, that Chichester and
the London authorities were treating allegations that he had been involved in
treasonable activities very seriously. According to the testimony of a
Franciscan friar, Archduke Albert had received information from England that
the earl of Tyrone would not be allowed to return to Ireland following his
proposed trip to court at Michaelmas 1607. The archduke had also been told
(correctly) that Tyrconnell was to be arrested and incarcerated in Ireland.
Having received this information, the archduke dispatched an envoy from
Flanders to alert the earls to the situation about one month before the flight
occurred. The courier was instructed to acquaint the earls with this
intelligence and to advise them to 'be in readiness for the coming of a ship,
which would soon be sent for them'.68 Many aspects of the friar's
version of events, in particular the timing of the earls' receipt of the
message from the Low Countries and the fact that such a warning existed, can
be verified by other sources.69
While
there may be no doubt now that Tyrone received advance warning of the arrival
of a ship to carry him to the continent, the accuracy of the information
passed on to him about the London government's intentions is open to serious
question. Kerney Walsh has used her analysis of continental archives
tentatively to ascribe the provenance of this warning to the pro-Catholic earl
of Northampton, a senior figure on the English privy council.70 What
is questionable, however, is the accuracy of Northampton's knowledge of the
true state of the investigations into Tyrone's alleged treasonable conduct. If
he had been thoroughly apprised of the situation, he would have realised that
while Tyrone was being assiduously investigated, a concrete case had not been
formulated against him by the summer of 1607. Northampton's uncertain grasp of
these affairs is readily explicable. The highly sensitive inquiries conducted
into Tyrone's affairs were mainly carried out between the earl of Salisbury
and Chichester.71 In fact Salisbury personally supervised Irish
affairs to such an extent following Lord Lieutenant Devonshire's death in 1606
that other members of the English privy council were often unaware of his
decisions regarding them.72 Northampton, as a result, may only have
been in a position to know that Tyrone was under suspicion without being aware
of the progress of the government's inquiries.
_______________________________________________________________________________
67 Chichester to Salisbury, 7 Sept. 1607 (ibid., SP 63/222/126).
68 Examination of Thomas Fitzgerald, 3 Oct. 1607 (ibid., SP
63/222/150a). Of those interrogated after the flight by Chichester, Kerney
Walsh describes the friar's evidence as the 'most plausible' (Destruction, p.
51).
69
Information of James Rath, 7 Oct. 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/222/152a); Sir Cormac
O'Neill's confession and appendage by Chichester, Oct. 1607 (ibid., SP
63/222/164a); Kerney Walsh, Destruction, documents 43a, 56b.
70 Kerney Walsh, Destruction, p. 45.
71 Owing to the need for secrecy, Chichester was the only Dublin
official aware of all the details of the investigations (see Chichester to
Salisbury, 26 June 1607 (P.R.O., SP 63/221/89)).
72
John McCavitt, 'The lord deputy ship of Sir Arthur Chichester in Ireland,
1605-16' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, Belfast, 1988), pp
329, 381.
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