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*Article scanned from original printed version – always refer to original printed text before quoting/citation* 

 This essay won the prize of  The Catholic Record Society 1991 

LORD DEPUTY CHICHESTER AND THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT'S 'MANDATES POLICY' IN IRELAND, 1605-1607 

by JOHN McCAVITT

 

ONE of the liveliest debates in recent early modern Irish historiogra­phy has concerned the 'failure' of the Reformation in Ireland and when this occurred. Originally Professor Canny took issue with Dr. Brendan Bradshaw on this topic. Canny rejected Bradshaw's thesis that the Reformation had failed in Ireland by 1558 and argued that counter-reformation catholicism only triumphed in the nineteenth cen­tury.1 Other contributions were then made to the debate by Dr. Alan Ford and later Karl Bottigheimer.2 Ford considered the 1590-1641 period as crucial, while Bottigheimer favoured the early seventeenth century as the key era. In the light of the work of Ford and Bottigheimer, Canny reconsidered the issue in an article published in 1986. He rejected what he believed to be Ford's overly-pessimistic assessment that the Church of Ireland clergy soon despaired of the Reformation's success in the seventeenth century. Instead, it is contended, Protestant clergy and laymen alike were optimistic that penal prosecution might still pave the way for considerable advances at this time. Moreover, Canny further argued that Ford was 'mistaken in treating the clergy as an autonomous group and mistaken also in allowing excessive influence to ideology as the determinant of policy'. In particular, he discounted the suggestion that the Church of Ireland clergy adhered to the doctrine of predesti­nation as justification for failing to pursue a campaign of evangelisation. Contrary to Ford, Canny argued 'the reality was that the lay leaders in the Irish Protestant community always asserted themselves as the formulators of policy'. Finally, Canny absolved the seventeenth century' Irish Protestant community from any imputation that 'they were not sincere in their professed concern to bring the Protestant faith to the Irish population at the point when their political dominance in the country was assured'. Lack of progress should be explained 'in terms of political interference from England or by historical accident rather than by lack of commitment on the part of their ministers'.3

In analysing the 'Mandates' policy of Lord Deputy Chichester's government during 1605-7, it is not proposed to offer any pronunciation about when precisely the Reformation ultimately failed in Ireland. Rather, in a more limited context, some remarks will he offered about

 


 

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whether or not the Reformation could be considered to have been a lost cause in Ireland by the first decade of the seventeenth century.4

In the history of the Reformation in Ireland the conclusion of the Tyrone rebellion in 1603 was a crucial juncture. For the first time the English authorities in Ireland could 'begin to think in terms of thorough­-going reform backed by the full authority of the State'.5 On being appointed Lord Deputy in October 1604, Sir Arthur Chichester received a series of instructions from James I. One of the key issues he was enjoined to address was the advancement of the Reformation in Ireland.6 Taking the King at his word, Chichester and other Irish Government officials formulated a comprehensive reform package. They produced a bifurcated religious policy. Chichester's strategy, in brief, was to use prerogative powers to underpin a campaign of 'coercion', while simultaneously embarking on a programme of 'persuasive' measures. This policy was, therefore, very much in the mould of the 'sword and word' strategy employed earlier by Cromwell in England, a ploy which sixteenth century reformers in Ireland did not utilise.7

 

 

'PERSUASIVE' MEASURES

 

Chichester realised that forcing Catholics into conforming was but the first step towards securing genuine conversion. It was for this reason that concurrent 'persuasive' measures were planned, and to some extent implemented, in the course of the 'Mandates' campaign. By their very nature, these 'persuasive' measures depended on a much longer time span for their successful realisation than their 'coercive' counterparts. As it happened, Chichester was forced to abandon his 'Mandates' policy in the summer of 1607. Therefore these 'persuasive' measures had little time to take effect and perhaps this is one reason why historians have failed to detect the seriousness with which Chichester treated them.

Bradshaw has identified three key techniques which advocates of 'persuasion' emphasized in the sixteenth century, 'evangelization', 'for­mal education' and 'vernacularization'.8 Evidence shows that Chichester and his colleagues in the Irish administration had a commitment to all three during the 'Mandates' era, 1605-7. Concurrently with the' coerc­ive' tactics, efforts were made to revamp the Church of Ireland, in both human and physical terms, in order to pave the way for the evangelization drive. Comprehensive measures were proposed, for instance, to establish a 'learned ministry', while at an early stage Chichester identified short-comings in the performance of Protestant bishops as a key source of concern.9

Of course, one should not be naive 'in accepting that stated intentions are always identical with a willingness or capacity to perform'.1O In practice, however, Chichester's administration clearly endeavoured to

 


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implement its proposals. A royal commission issued in July 1605 was designed to undertake inquisitions into church property with a view to making provision for the 'planting' of 'learned' ministers.11 A large number of such inquisitions were undertaken throughout the country during the summer and autumn of 1606.12

As far as the 'vernacularization' and 'formal education' proposals were concerned, recommendations were also made to facilitate these. It was suggested, for example, that various religious texts and prayers should be printed in Irish, while there was also a proposal to establish schools throughout the country.13 Again evidence shows that efforts were made to implement these measures. Chichester, for instance, provided finance for the printing of important religious texts in Irish.14 As for schooling, he supervised arrangements for the establishing of a 'free school' in Monaghan in 1606.15

On the whole, there is little doubt that Chichester's administration treated its 'persuasive' measures seriously.16 The success or failure of the 'Mandates' policy however, depended on Chichester's ability to employ 'coercive' measures against the recusants. His whole strategy was based on their success. As it turned out, the controversy surrounding these matters ultimately dictated the fate of the entire campaign.

 

'COERCIVE' MEASURES-THE CAMPAIGN IN DUBLIN

 

In practice, the 'coercive' aspects of the 'Mandates' policy were first implemented in Dublin in the autumn of 1605. The capital city was chosen for initial action because it was 'the lantern of this whole kingdom and in this matter the only place whereon the eyes and expectation of all the rest are earnestly foreseen'.17 Chichester also made it clear at the outset that he was determined to act against those 'by whose example the rest of the people are most led'.18 A proclamation banishing Catholic priests and ordering the laity to attend Protestant services was published in October 1605.19 It was also soon made clear that the Deputy would use his prerogative powers to back up the proclamation. Chichester considered the one shilling fine provision of Statute 2 Elizabeth grossly inadequate for enforcing attendance at Protestant services by leading recusants.20 Yet the prospect of much severer punishments did not frighten the recusants into attending such services. Eventually, 'Mandates', or letters, were sent out to sixteen wealthy individuals, who had been carefully singled out as influential recusants in the capital city, ordering them to attend Protestant services. Again, the 'Mandates' were also disregarded. In consequence, fines of up to £100 were imposed on the recusants in the prerogative court of Castle Chamber in November 1605. The defendants were also impri­soned 'till they have conformed themselves'.21 Before long, proceedings were taken against hundreds of Dublin citizens under the one shilling fine provision of Statute 2 Elizabeth.22

 


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A co-ordinated recusant response to the Dublin Government's policy rapidly manifested itself. A petition signed by most of the nobility and gentry of the five Pale counties was addressed to Chichester in November 1605. It remonstrated against the Government's religious policy in Dublin.23 The Lord Deputy and the Irish administration, however, took grave offence at the manner of this protest, considering it 'dishonourable for the State to be in this manner confronted with a multitude of hands, especially in a matter so contrary to his Highness's Proclamation'. It was decided, therefore, to punish the instigators of the petition. As a result, a number of them, including Viscount Gormanston and Sir Patrick Barnewall, were imprisoned in Dublin castle. Others were confined to their homes.24

The struggle had now been joined in earnest between the recusants of Dublin and the Pale, and Lord Deputy Chichester and the Irish administration. The formidable nature of the recusant opposition did not come as a shock to the Government. It was anticipated that the recusants would not only loudly protest but that they would appeal to the London authorities for redress of their grievances. Chichester and his colleagues were keenly aware that previous recusant appeals against prosecution on religious grounds had been successful. They therefore implored the London administration to support their actions on this occasion.25

Certainly, the Dublin Government's determination to pursue its policy in the early stages of 1606 was unmistakable. Other recusants faced 'Mandates' proceedings in January 1606, before the London Govern­ment responded to the initial events in Castle Chamber which had occurred in November 1605.26 It was also in the important interval between the implementation of the 'Mandates' policy in the latter period of 1605, and when the attitude of the London administration towards it became known in Dublin in late February 1606, that Chichester illustrated the extent to which he was prepared to go to ensure success. It was during these intervening months that he acknowledged that his religious proceedings could well precipitate violent reaction, but that he had laid careful martial plans to subdue any such opposition.27 The confrontational nature of his religious policy was thereby made manifest.

If Chichester and his colleagues thought they could count on full support in London for their stance, especially, perhaps, in the aftermath of the Gunpowder Plot in November 1605, they were to be mistaken. The Privy Council's response in January 1606 proved a major disap­pointment. Essentially, the Irish Government was ordered to tone down its religious policy. The London Government was concerned about the dangerous repercussions which might ensue from the prosecution of such a rigorous anti-recusant campaign.28 The last thing it wanted was trouble in Ireland and Chichester's hints that this was a distinct possibility were thus alarming.

 


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The London Government was convinced 'that a main alteration is not to be obtained by forcing against the current, but gaining little by little'. Consequently, Chichester was advised to release all those who had been incarcerated for their involvement in the Palesmen's petition, with the exception of Sir Patrick Barnewall. He was summoned to England. The aldermen and others imprisoned under the 'Mandates' were to be released on payment of their fines, while searches for priests were to cease immediately. A total rejection of the Irish administration's strategy was studiously avoided. Permission was granted to make examples of notorious recusant offenders so that 'the rest may be kept in awe'.29 What had happened, in fact, was that Chichester had embarked on his religious policy without the prior approval of the King and the Privy Council for the specific methods employed. Had they been informed beforehand there is little doubt that the 'Mandates' device would not have received approbation.30 As it was, however, the die had been cast and the London authorities were anxious not to undermine the newly appointed Lord Deputy.

The London Government's attitude, however, clearly came as a shock and a source of great disappointment to the Lord Deputy. At one stage, in protest, Chichester appealed to be relieved of his post over the issue.31 As it turned out, the Deputy remained in his position and the policy continued to be applied, if in an ostensibly more circumspect manner. The Deputy was thereafter careful to present his campaign in a much less 'coercive' light and assurances were given that moderation had been employed.32 In reality, however, Government records indicate that intense pressure was maintained on the recusants. Those imprisoned under the initial 'Mandates' proceedings remained incarcerated until the summer of 1606,33 while more people were brought before Castle Chamber. They too were heavily fined and imprisoned.34

To get the full story perhaps of what was happening, Government records have to be balanced against contemporary Catholic accounts, as the latter paint a very lurid picture. According to Catholic sources, priests were 'a prey to a savage soldiery' and they were in 'imminent danger of death at every moment'.35 Moreover, it was alleged that sharp practices were used in the collection of fines which had been imposed on recusants:-36

No doors, no enclosures, no wall can stop them in their course; they are unmoved by the shrieks of the females and by the weeping of the children. Everything is torn open, and whatever is of any value is set aside to be taken away, whatever is worthless is thrown in the streets, and devoted to the flames. Silver cups are called chalices, and gems are designated Agnus Deis, and are all, therefore, carried away. Whatever is for profane uses, they profess to regard as sacred, and bear it off, and whatever is sacred they seize on to desecrate.37

 

Whatever can be said about the respective reliability of the Government or Catholic accounts, one thing is indisputable - both concur that

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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recusants were placed under very considerable pressure by the Govern­ment's actions.

It seems that the permission which had been granted to Chichester and the Dublin Government to make examples of selected individuals was crucial. It offered the escape clause they manifestly wanted and, as a result, the 'Mandates' campaign continued. What is more, the 'Mandates' mechanism was subsequently applied in many more instances than the Privy Council might ideally have liked. Not only, indeed, was the 'Mandates' policy persisted with in Dublin, but it was also employed much more widely in the spring of 1606. Proceedings were not only undertaken in Galway but in Munster too where Sir Henry Brouncker, the Lord President, zealously embraced the policy.38

The evidence suggests that the Government's vigorous Reformation campaign made substantial progress at this time and not just as a result of its 'coercive' measures. A Catholic priest, Eugene Bernard, recorded his alarm at the state of affairs when he arrived in Galway in 1606. He discovered that 'three infernal wolves' (i.e. Protestant ministers) had made substantial progress there as a result of energetic evangelical work.39 This evidence of Protestant success in Galway, even if it was only transitory, provides a striking parallel with the situation there in the 1580s and 1590s. Then, too, Protestantism made progress for a time in this area.40

In the spring of 1606 the main focus of the 'Mandates' affair crystallised around Sir Patrick Barnewall's summons to England. He had originally incurred the displeasure of the London Government on account of a letter which he had sent to Sir Robert Cecil in the winter of 1605 in which he warned that the 'Mandates' could precipitate armed recusant resistance.41 He then gave additional offence by his disrespectful behaviour before the Lord Deputy and Council when he lambasted the 'Mandates' policy. Apparently, Barnewall 'struck the cushion before the Deputy sitting in Council and held his hand there on till he was reproved for it.'42 In fact, he had become the leader of recusant resistance to the Reformation campaign. For this reason, the Dublin Government considered it imperative that he be appropriately punished because it would 'daunt others who for their contempt are yet restrained and cannot frame themselves to submission, or other resolution until they understand what will be done and determined upon his coming

thither.'43

The London authorities were placed in a difficult position as a result of Barnewall's prominence in the 'Mandates' affair. As a gesture of solidarity with the Dublin Government, it was determined to punish him. It had no intention, however, of coercing him into apostatising. In the end, it was decided to confine him to the Tower. As for the 'Mandates', the Privy Council requested the Irish administration to forward the legal precedents justifying their use in religious matters.44 As a result of this Chichester decided during the summer of 1606 to

 


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suspend 'Mandates' proceedings in Castle Chamber until the London authorities pronounced on the legality of the 'Mandates' technique.45 At this point, the main thrust of the 'Mandates' campaign switched to Munster where the Lord President, Sir Henry Brouncker, continued it apace.

 

BROUNCKER'S ACTIVITIES IN MUNSTER

 

Chichester sent Brouncker an 'exemplification' of Statute 2 Elizabeth at the end of November 1605. In accordance with the Deputy's instruc­tions the Lord President summoned the leading citizens of Cork before him and implored them to conform themselves to the act. On their refusal, he issued 'Mandates' to selected individuals and proceeded to fine and imprison them at the end of February 1606.46 Subsequent action was taken in other parts of the province in the spring of 1606.47 By September, Brouncker had taken the religious policy one stage further. Utilising a royal commission issued to him for taking the oath of supremacy from all the municipal officers in Munster, he deposed the mayors and sovereigns of almost every town in the province.48 In Waterford five mayors were deposed in rapid succession.49

The 'coercive' methods of Brouncker, it is worth noting, were underpinned by 'persuasive' measures. The Bishop of Cork employed the services of twenty two ministers for preaching, while 'readers' were provided for the Gaelic Irish.5O As a result of this vigorous campaign Brouncker reported that many of the Munster towns were almost 'wholly reclaimed' to the State Church by the Winter of 1606,51 claims that were hotly denied by Catholic priests working in the area at the

time.52

Government and Catholic sources concur, however, that Brouncker employed particularly severe measures. Heavy fines, for instance, total­ling almost £7000, were meted out.53 Not surprisingly, the Munster Catholics bitterly resented the President's actions. Reflecting on Brouncker's tenure of office as Munster President, the Catholic Arch­bishop of Cashel at the time concluded that 'he lived among us like another emissary of Antichrist, for three years and a half, and it was his boast that his health improved the more the maledictions of the Catholics were heaped upon him'.54

 

THE 'MANDATES' POLICY IS REACTIVATED IN CASTLE CHAMBER

 

News of Brouncker's 'successes' inspired the Dublin Government to renewed vigour in defence of their own proceedings. Chichester claimed in December 1606 that Brouncker had only been able to achieve such remarkable results because of the 'deaf ear' which had been given to

 


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the Munster recusants who came to Dublin to complain about him.55 There is more than a hint in the Deputy's correspondence in December 1606, indeed, that a 'deaf ear' should also be given by the London Government to the recusant complaints which had been chanelled through Barnewall. By this time, in fact, the Irish Government had decided that it would be preferable if Barnewall was transmitted back to Dublin for sentencing and the punishment which he would then receive 'will be a better example to the nation in general'.56 This request was clearly a token of the Lord Deputy and Council's dissatisfaction with the degree of support emanating from England. After all, it had been originally believed in Dublin that Barnewall had been brought to England to receive exemplary punishment.

Further testimony of the Lord Deputy and Council's frustration with the hesitating response of the London Government is provided by the fact that the 'Mandates' policy was reactivated in Castle Chamber in December 1606 and a number of people subsequently fined and imprisoned.57 This was before any pronouncement by the English judicial authorities on the legality of the 'Mandates' had been received in Dublin.58 Chichester, in reporting these actions to the London Government, made his personal disgruntlement with the whole situation abundantly clear when he indicated that 'unless I be further animated from thence, I could gladly leave the managing of the business to the clergy and the penal laws'.59

Evidently stirred by this barely concealed criticism, the London administration soon responded by signifying that the 'Mandates' had been declared legal by the judicial authorities in England. What is more, they announced that Barnewall, contrary to being permitted to act as an agent for toleration, had been in the Tower since his arrival in England. Indeed, although he had been released by the date of this missive, the end of December 1606, it was only on the grounds that he had acknowledged his offences and that he had been put 'upon bond' to make a similar submission to Chichester and the Irish Council within four days of his arrival back in Ireland.60

Chichester was obviously delighted with this outcome of events and he travelled to Drogheda in early 1607 to supervise penal proceedings. Once more Government and Catholic sources clash about what hap­pened, the latter alleging, for example, that Chichester personally resorted to exceptionally intimidatory tactics and even violence in his endeavour to force the Catholics into attending state services.61 If there is some dispute about the methods Government officials employed, there is none about their impact. A Catholic priest writing at the time admitted that 'the inhabitants of Drogheda, a populous town, and hitherto so tenacious to the faith, all went to the Protestant churches last lent-hardly a dozen of them remained away'.62

 


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THE END OF THE 'MANDATES'

 

The euphoria in the ranks of the Irish administration on receiving news of Sir Patrick Barnewall's 'submission' in London, and the elation attendant on their apparent successes, once the legality of the 'Mandates' had been confirmed, soon dissipated. Before long, the London auth­orities not only moved once again to reduce the impact of the 'Mandates' campaign, particularly in Munster, but the policy itself was aborted.

The beginning of this process was heralded by the stern advice delivered to Chichester and Brouncker in April 1607 concerning the latter's activities in the southern province. All along, the Privy Council had been convinced that Brouncker had been pursuing a 'moderate course of severity'.63 It then learned, to its dismay, from a petition presented by the recusants of Cork, that 'extraordinary courses' had been employed by the Munster President.64 So seriously did the London administration take these complaints that it signified its belief that it was extremely fortunate that the Munster towns had not revolted.65 As a result, Brouncker was instructed to release the imprisoned Munster recusants on bonds. Somewhat equivocally, however, the London auth­orities confirmed that they would still countenance the employment of severe measures against those guilty of 'notorious disobedience' or 'public affront'.66 Again, as with the January 1606 instructions, this was sufficient for Chichester. He was determined to continue with his activities.67 It is possible indeed, that the 'Mandates' policy would have been sustained for a much longer period but for developments in Gaelic Ulster.

By the summer of 1607, investigations had been continuing for some time into an apparent conspiracy by the Earl of Tyrone to raise a new revolt in Ireland with the assistance of foreign troops. The plot, it was alleged by Government informers, had substantial support in the Old English recusant towns. Until the end of June 1607, however, the English Privy Council had not taken these reports very seriously. Then Lord Howth returned to Ireland from the Low Countries and related to Chichester that Tyrone's plans for rebellion were at an advanced stage. Although uncertain how far to trust the testimony of Howth, his story greatly alarmed the English Privy Council. As a result, it was not prepared to take chances. Chichester was ordered to arrest Tyrone if he believed sufficient evidence had been unearthed to convict him of treason.68

It was in this volatile context that Old English religious grievances assumed great importance. The London Government was concerned that Old English recusant discontent might fuse with Gaelic Irish anger in the event of action being taken against Tyrone. Consequently, Chichester was ordered in no uncertain terms in July 1607 to bring the 'Mandates' policy to a conclusion and this he reluctantly conceded to do.69 It was this complex intertwining of events which resulted in the

 


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Mandates' policy being brought to a discreet conclusion in the summer of 1607.

But how much truth was there in the intelligence reports that the Old English Catholics were preparing to rebel and even throw in their lot with the Earl of Tyrone? Certainly, it is worth recalling Sir Patrick Barnewall's warning at the outset of the 'Mandates' that should Chichester persist with his policy then a recusant revolt would result. Of course, the recusants proved to be intensely aggrieved by the Government's penal proceedings and the atmosphere in Old English recusant areas must have been very tense. One Munster Catholic, John Burke, did resort to arms in defence of a priest who was staying in his castle and was executed as a result.70 The evidence is not conclusive, however, that Old English recusants really were on the verge of resorting en masse to armed resistance, or allying with Tyrone.

Consider, then, a second scenario. It is more than a distinct possibility that elements in the Old English recusant community may have deliber­ately fomented rumours of imminent rebellion and an alliance with the Gaelic Irish as a device designed to exert maximum pressure on the Government. What is not in doubt, of course, is that the currency of these rumours persuaded the London Government to order the cessation of the 'Mandates'. Ironically, whilst such hearsay may have saved the day for the Old English Catholics it was arguably at the expense of their Gaelic Irish co-religionists.

Convinced by the plethora of intelligence reports about imminent rebellion in Ireland, the London authorities not only ended the 'Mandates' policy but they also suddenly took a much less favourable viewpoint of the Earl of Tyrone's alleged activities by the summer of 1607. Accordingly, they summoned him to England. As it turned out, Tyrone's anxiety that the English authorities were on the verge of charging him with treason played a key role in his decision to flee abroad.71 Thus, whilst Chichester had to abort the 'Mandates' campaign by the summer of 1607 the circumstances in which this happened led directly to the Flight of the Earls, an event which in turn, gave birth to the Plantation of Ulster. The ramifications of the 'Mandates' policy, therefore, were arguably enormous.

 

CONCLUSION

 

So far as Lord Deputy Chichester was concerned, the religious question was the key issue of his tenure of office. He could be described, in fact, as a missionary Lord Deputy.72 He identified a symbiotic relationship between faithfulness to the 'true' religion and fidelity to the Crown.73 The history of the 'Mandates' campaign testifies to his determination to resolve the religious question. Not only did he set the draconian trend of the ‘Mandates’ campaign by his initial actions in


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Castle Chamber, but he later travelled to Drogheda to undertake 'Mandates' proceedings there-actions which earned him the reputation of a Nero among recusants.74 Moreover, it was Chichester, as we have seen, who asked to be relieved of his position as Lord Deputy in the spring of 1606 because the London authorities had not given him their full backing. In addition, he probably risked losing his job later the same year by the manner in which he criticised the London authorities for their failure to support his stand, implicitly accusing them of pusillanimous conduct. The question remains, however, did he jeopard­ise his job for nothing?

On a practical level, for instance, shortage of trained Protestant clergy, the dilapidated infrastructure of the Church of Ireland and the reluctance of King James and the London Government to sanction tough measures are factors which militated against the success of the 'Mandates' campaign.75 Moreover, counter-reformation Catholicism was making major advances at this time. Could Chichester have made substantial progress in the face of such formidable obstacles?

Considering the counter-reformation Catholic Church in Ireland first, evidence shows that it too suffered from 'inadequate' numbers of clergy to cater for the whole country in the early seventeenth century.76 Clearly, these problems would have been greatly exacerbated if the 'Mandates' policy had been pursued on a long term basis. As for the delapidation of the Protestant churches, the visitations carried out in the various dioceses in the early seventeenth century are often cited as proof of widespread ruination. Yet, in some areas they also illustrate that churches had been, or were being, repaired.77 Again, one can only wonder how much further progress might have been made if Chichester's religious programme had been maintained.

The restraints placed on Chichester's government by the London authorities should also not be over-emphasised. In the first place, the 'Mandates' era demonstrates that the Irish Government was capable of exercising a considerable degree of 'latitude' in interpreting the London Government's instructions.78 For almost two years, indeed, it sustained its 'Mandates' policy without the wholehearted backing of London. What is more, subsequent experience during the rest of Chichester's term of office undermines the theory that King James could not be won round to a tough anti-recusant line.79 After all, the King sanctioned the executions of Bishop O'Devanna and a priest called Patrick Lough­ran in 1612, while he also approved a package of strong anti-recusant measures proposed by the Lord Deputy in June 1614.80

It remains true, none the less, that while James and the London authorities were prepared to go much further in permitting tougher anti-recusant measures than may hitherto have been suspected, they still fell short of the degree of coercion which Chichester felt necessary for a truly effective, confrontational, anti-recusant policy. The Deputy realised, following his 'Mandates' experience, that he was unlikely to

 


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be permitted to employ the necessary measures to resolve the religious issue once and for all. Consequently, he never approached the anti­-recusant activities of the later stages of his deputyship with the same degree of enthusiasm or expectation that he had earlier attached to the 'Mandates' campaign.81 He had made a mistake in taking the King at his word and during the remainder of his term of office he was careful not to treat the King's expostulations on religious matters at face value.82

On the whole, the 'Mandates' campaign represented a dynamic attempt to transmute radically the religious configuration of Ireland. The Reformation flag had finally been struck only to be rather hastily hauled down as a result of the nervousness of the King and London administration. Nevertheless, it proved an important, if not the key phase, in the battle between Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Ireland. The English had fought to control Ireland militarily in the late sixteenth century and finally won in 1603. The 'Mandates' campaign represented the English (in this case, Dublin) authorities' whole-hearted attempt to capitalise on this favourable situation. .

As it turned out, the 'conquest' had drained the resources of the English crown to such an extent that it was considered unthinkable in London that efforts to protestantize Ireland should risk further hos­tilities.83 The testimony of the 1605-7 period, however, suggests that further financial sacrifice, had it been necessary, might have reaped rich dividends and that the abandonment of the 'Mandates' campaign therefore represented a lost opportunity. Shortage of trained Protestant clergy, of course, would undoubtedly have circumscribed the success of the campaign. If the 'Mandates' policy had been sustained, however, it could well have broken down recusant resistance to a considerable extent and achieved substantial long term results in urban, English-­speaking areas at least. Certainly, there were European parallels to the Irish experience in the early modern period in which forceful conversion had worked-backed up, of course, by 'persuasive' measure.84

Short-comings in Catholic church organisation in Ireland in the early seventeenth century and the evidence of transitory Protestant success in Galway on the basis of a determined evangelical drive, reinforce the suspicion that the success of the Counter Reformation was not a foregone conclusion in Ireland by this time. As it was, sporadic campaigns such as those at the time of the 'Mandates', and later when Bishop O'Devanna was executed in 1612, not only served to generate growing Old English political disenchantment with the Dublin adminis­tration but to bolster the Counter-Reformation cause in Ireland.85 One wonders how much different the story might have been had the London authorities really invested in the 'Mandates' campaign.

 


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                                                              ABBREVIATIONS

A.H.           Archivium Hibernicum.

 

Bottig.       Karl Bottigheimar, 'The failure of the Reformation in Ireland; une question bien posée, in

                   The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 36, no. 2 (April, 1985), pp. 196-207.

 

Cann         Nicholas Canny, 'Why the Reformation failed in Ireland: une question mal posée', in The

                  Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 30, no. 4 (Oct. 1979), pp. 423-50.

 

Davies      Sir John Davies, Historical tracts, to which is prefixed a new life of the author, (London, 1786).

 

Fitz.         Henry Fitzsimon, Words of Comfort to Persecuted Catholics, ed. by Edmund Hogan (Dublin,

                 1881).

 

Ford        The Protestant Reformation in Ireland, 1590-1641, (Frankfurt, 1985).

 

I.E.R.      Irish Ecclesiastical Record.

 

J.B.S.      Journal of British Studies.

 

Lenn      The Lords of Dublin in the Age of the Reformation, (Dublin, 1989).

 

McCav   'The lord deputyship of Sir Arthur Chichester in Ireland, 1605-16', unpublished Ph.D

                thesis, (Queen's University, Belfast, 1988).

 

Moran    History of the Catholic Archbishops of Dublin Since the Refor­mation, (Dublin, 1864).

 

NOTES

 

1 Cann., passim.

2 Ford, Bottig, passim.

3 Nicholas Canny, 'Protestants, Planters and Apartheid in Early Modern Ireland', Irish Historical Studies, 25, no. 98, (Nov. 1986), pp. 105-15.

4 Much of the specific analysis of the 'Mandates' policy, it will be clear, supports some of the general conclusions offered by Canny in his reconsidered overview of the early seventeenth century. The present writer, however, would emphasise the leading role played by the secular authorities in this campaign even more. He would argue, indeed, that during the 'Mandates' era some Protestant clergy may have been resentful of the leading role assumed by the secular authorities in this campaign, displeased at the manner in which Chichester criticised its bishops and angered by the way in which church affairs were pried into by laymen.

5 Ford, p. 42.

6 King to Chichester, 16 Oct. 1604 (P .R.O., 31/81203 f. 27).

7 Brendan Bradshaw, 'Sword, Word and Strategy in the Reformation in Ireland', Historical Journal, 

   21, (1978), pp. 475-502.

8 Ibidem.

9 Memorials for Reformation of the Clergy and Establishing of a Learned Ministry, P.R.O., 31/8/ 199 ff. 12-5); Chichester to Salisbury, 2 Nov. 1605 (P.R.O., S.P.631217/80). The exact dating of the 'memorials' is not certain. Historical context strongly suggests that these 'memorials' were the product of the animated discussions which took place within the Irish administration after Chichester assumed the deputyship in February 1605.

10 Cann. p. 429.

11 Commission for Making of Shires and Divers Other Matters, 19 July 1605 in J. C. Erck, Repertory of the Inrolments on the Patent Rolls of Chancery in Ireland Commencing with the Reign of James I, (Dublin, 1846), pp. 182-4; Davies, pp. 217-1. Chichester persisted with this policy in spite of opposition from the ecclesiastical lobby on the Irish Council who disliked such lay interference in internal church affairs.

12 Davies, pp. 217-71; Davies to Salisbury, 12 Nov. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.631219/132).

13 Memorials for Reformation of the Clergy and Establishing a Learned Ministry in Ireland, (P.R.O.,

    31/8/199 ff. 12-5). See note 9 about the dating of this document.

14 James Perrot, The Chronicle of Ireland, 1584-1608, ed. by Herbert Wood, p. 184. William Daniells dedicated his translation of the book of Common Prayer to Chichester, see C. L. Falkiner (ed.) 'William Farmer's Chronicles of Ireland' in English Historical Review, no. 85, (1907), p. 535.

15 Davies, pp. 217-71.

16 For further details concerning the practical 'persuasive' measures which the Irish government undertook at this time see McCav. chapter seven.

17 Lord Deputy and Council to Privy Council, 5 Dec. 1605 (P.R.O., S.P.631217/95).

18 Chichester to Devonshire, 29 Oct. 1605 (P.R.O., S.P.631217/79). In a very interesting recent study of the 'Mandates' policy as it affected Dublin, Lennon argues that 'it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the aldermen and their fellow-merchants were targets of political and economic resentment as much as of religious restriction', (Lenn. p. 171). Although not ruling out that such considerations played a part, it could be argued that the policy of targeting the wealthy was a tactical measure motivated primarily by religious considerations.


THE 'MANDATES' PDLICY, 1605-7

 

333

 

19 Lenn. p. 178. Note that the 'Mandates' policy probably would have begun in the summer of 1605 but for an outbreak of plague affecting Dublin, see Chichester to Devonshire, 29 Oct. 1605 (P.R.O., S.P .63/217/79).

20 Chichester to Devonshire, 29 Oct. 1605 (P.R.O., S.P.63/217/79).

21 Lord Deputy and Council to Privy Council, 5 Dec. 1605 (P.R.O., S.P.63/217/95).

22 Hans Pawlisch, Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland; a Study in Legal Imperialism, (Cambridge, 1985), chapter six.

23 Chichester to Salisbury, 7 Dec. 1605 (P.R.O., S.P.63/217/89).

24 Lord Deputy and Council to Privy Council, 5 Dec. 1605 (P.R.O., S.P.63/217/95).

25 Ibidem. This recusant tactic had a long-standing tradition as a 'conservative' defence strategy of the Did English community, see Ciaran Brady, 'Conservative Subversives: the Community of the Pale and the Dublin Administration, 1556-86', in P. J. Corish (ed.) 'Radicals, Rebels and Establishments', Historical Studies, 15 (Belfast, 1985), pp. 11-32.

26 The English Privy Council's response was not received until 21 Feb. 1606, see Privy Council to Chichester, 24 Jan. 1606 (P.R.O., 31/8/199 ff. 62-5). Nevertheless, further 'Mandates' proceedings were carried out in Castle Chamber in Jan. 1606, see Decree of Castle Chamber, 29 Jan. 1606 (Calendar State Papers Ireland, 1603-6); H.M.C., Egmont, 1, pt. 1, p. 31.

27 See, for example, Chichester to Devonshire, 2 Jan. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/218/1) in which Chichester revealed that he had spies 'in all quarters' and troops at the ready 'to take any opportunity if it be offered' .

28 Privy Council to Chichester, 24 Jan. 1606 (P.R.O., 31/8/199 ff. 62-5). Note that the refusal to countenance an all-out anti-recusant drive in Ireland in the wake of the Gunpowder Plot accorded with the 'moderate' response to the plot in England. See John J. LaRocca, "'Who Can't Pray With Me, Can't Love Me"; Toleration and the Early Jacobean Recusant Policy', J.B.S., 23, no. 2, (1984), p.30.

29 Privy Council to Chichester, 24 Jan. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.31/8/199 ff. 62-5).

30 The sequence of events in Dublin in October and November 1605 suggests that while the Deputy was preparing to use prerogative power to underpin his religious policy, the actual 'Mandates' device was hit upon almost at the last minute, leaving no time for consultation with London.

31 Chichester to Salisbury, 27 Apr. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/218/49).

32 Lord Deputy and Council to Privy Council, 7 Mar. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/218/23).

33 Chichester to Salisbury, 4 July 1606 (P.R.D., S.P.63/219/76).

34 H.M.C., Egmont, 1, pt. 1, pp. 31-2.

35 Fitz., Words, pp. 133-5.

36 Declaration of James Duff and Nicholas Humfrey, 11 Mar. 1606, (P .R.O., S.P .63/218/33); I.E.R., 10, (1984), p. 180; Moran, p. 232.

37 Moran, p. 232. This source indicates that the authorities made a determined bid to raise the fines imposed. Lennon argues, by contrast, that 'only a fraction' of the fines worth £1580 meted out in Castle Chamber was paid, (Lenn. p. 171). An examination of financial records reveals, however, that £1145 of the fines levied at this time in Castle Chamber were actually paid, see B. L. Lansdowne MS 156, f. 233. The figure provided by the Lansdowne MS is stated to represent Castle Chamber fines realised on recusants for the financial year ending Michaelmas 1605. The dating, of course, is clearly erroneous and should have stated 1606 as the anti-recusant drive only started in the winter of 1605.

38 Hans Pawlisch, Sir John Davies and the Conquest of Ireland, A study of Legal Imperialism, (Cambridge, 1985) chapter six.

39 I.E.R., 10, (1874), pp. 459-60.

40 Cann. pp. 444-5; Bottig. p. 206.

41 Barnewall to Salisbury, 16 Dec. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/217/96).

42 Lord Deputy and Council to Privy Council, 23 Apr. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/218/43).

43 Chichester to Devonshire, 23 Apr. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/218/45).

44 Privy Council to Lord Deputy and Council, 3 July 1606 (P.R.O., 31/8/199 ff. 91-2).

45 Davies to Salisbury, 5 Dec. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/219/148).

46 Fitz. pp. 137-9.

47 Sir John Davies, 4 May 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/218/53).

48 Sir Henry Brouncker, ]2 Sept. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.631219/1O3a).

49 Archives of Waterford, H.M.C., Tenth Report, App. 5., p. 77.

50 Brouncker to Privy Council, 18 Nov. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/219/134).

51 Ibidem.

52 Fitz. passim.

53 Morrison to Salisbury, 25 June 1607 (P.R.O., S.P.63/221/87).

54 Moran, p. 235.

55 Chichester to Salisbury, 1 Dec. 1606 (P.R.O., S.P.63/219/147).

56 Ibidem.

57 Calendar of Patent Rolls, Ireland, James I, pp. 98-100; H.M.C., Egmont, 1, pt. 1, p. 32.

"This communication was not received in Ireland until 25 Feb., 1607, see Privy Council to Lord Deputy and Council, 31 Dec. 1606 (P.R.O., 31/8/199 ff. 195-9).

59 Chichester to Salisbury, 20 Feb. 1607 (P.R.O., S.P.63/221/21).

60 Privy Council to Lord Deputy and Council. 31 Dec. 1606 (P.R.O.. 31/8/199 ff. 195-9).

 


334

 

RECUSANT HISTORY

 

61 Reginald Walsh, 'Persecution of Catholics in Drogheda in 1606, 1607 and 1611', in A.H., 6 (1917), pp. 64-8); I.E.R., 10, (1874), pp. 519-21 and p. 523; Fitz. pp. 162-3.

62 Fitz. pp. 64-6.

63 Privy Council to Brouncker, 23 Dec. 1606 (P.R.O., 31/8/199 ff. 189-90). The death of Devonshire, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in April 1606 was an important juncture in the 'Mandates' campaign. He was an avowed opponent of any form of coercion. Had he lived the 'Mandates' campaign may well have had to be aborted at an even earlier stage than eventually proved the case.

64 Privy Council to Brouncker, 11 Apr. 1607 (P.R.O., 31/8/199 ff. 217-20).

65 Privy Council to Chichester and Lord Chancellor, 12 Apr. 1607 (P.R.O., 31/8/199 ff. 221-3).

66 See note 64.

67 Lord Deputy and Lord Chancellor to Privy Council, 1 May 1607 (P.R.O., S.P.63/221/42).

68 McCav. chapter eight.

69 Privy Council to Chichester, 22 July 1607 (P.R.O., 31/8/199 ff. 236-9); Chichester to Privy Council, 4 Aug. 1607 (P.R.O., S.P.63/222/112).

70 Fitz. pp. 147-9; Brouncker to Privy Council, 10 Feb. 1607 (P.R.O., S.P.63/221/15).

71 McCav. chapter eight.

72 In February 1609 Chichester evaluated the relative importance of the religious and civil reforms which were required and concluded, of his religious objective, that it was 'of great weight and consequence, wherein if there be no reformation, all the buildings and labour are in vain, and this needs no further argument or desertation', see Chichester to Privy Council, 5 Feb. 1609 (P .R.O.,

S.P.63/226/21).

73 Protestantization was described as 'the only sure ground of faithful obedience and good government', see Lord Deputy and Council to Privy Council, 5 Dec. 1605 (P.R.O., S.P.63/21795).

74 Fitz. pp. 162-3.

75 Ford, passim; Aidan Clarke, Plantation and the Catholic Question, 1603-23', in New History of Ireland, 3, (Oxford, 1976), pp. 190-1.

76 Bottig., p. 198.

77 M. A. Murphy, 'Royal Visitation of Cashel and Emly 1615', in A.H., I, (1912); M. A. Murphy, 'The Royal Visitation of Cork, Cloyne and Ross and the College of Youghall', A.H., 2 (1913), pp. 173-215; M. A. Murphy, 'The Royal Visitation, 1615, Diocese of Killaloe', in A.H., 3 (1914), pp. 210-26; M. A. Murphy, 'The Royal Visitation, 1615, Dioceses of Ardfert and Aghaloe', A.H., 4, (1915), pp. 178-98; M. V. Ronan, 'Royal Visitation of Dublin, 1615', in A.H., 8, (1941), pp. I-55. At the time of the 1613-15 Parliament complaints were made by recusants that they were forced to pay for the refurbishment of Protestant churches. Chichester confirmed that this had been the case, see John Lodge (ed.) Desiderata Curiosa Hibernica, 1, (Dublin, 1872), pp. 239-252.

78 Ford, p. 43.

79 Recent studies of King James I's religious policies in England illustrate that while he was ideologically opposed to 'persecution', he was willing to take action against anyone who threatened his regal position. Chichester, of course, portrayed Catholicism as posing a particularly serious threat to crown interests in Ireland. See J. J. LaRocca "'Who Can't Pray With Me, Can't Love Me", Toleration and the Early Jacobean Recusant Policy', in J.B.S., 23, no. 2 (1984), pp. 22-36; Jenny Wormald, 'Gunpowder, Treason and Scots', in J.B.S., 24 (1985) pp. 141-168; Kenneth Fincham and Peter Lake, 'The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James 1', in J.B.S., 24, (1985), pp. 169-207. John J. LaRocca, 'James I and his Catholic Subjects, 1606-1612; Some Financial Implications', Recusant History, 18, (1986-7), pp. 251-262.